Grey Ghosts- Part One
Wednesday, May 2nd, 2007In November 2005 I started reading the late Shelby Foote’s 3-volume narrative, The Civil War. If you’ve ever seen Ken Burns’ (liberal, biased and inaccurate) PBS series of the same title, Mr. Foote plays the unofficial voice of the South, interviewed by Burns whenever the Confederate perspective is needed. Foote has a most comforting voice to me, the old Southern accent that older people used to have (including many of my relatives) before the universalizing influence of television.
Now, a few caveats about Foote, who passed away in Memphis in 2005. He was a politically self-loathing Southerner, a man who never supported state sovereignty as an abstract right, either in the last century or the one before. He makes this clear in his notes in The Civil War series when he thanks mid-20th-century states’ rights Southern politicians for helping keep his natural bias towards southern valor in the war in check. Despite being from Mississippi, Foote was an open admirer of Lincoln, Grant and Sherman; Foote was also a defeatist who never thought the war was winnable on the Southern side.
But even with all of this baggage, the series is so well-written and Foote so constrains himself to the facts that he successfully overcomes these problems; and in the end, Foote is still a Southerner who can’t help himself but give his people a fair record of events. Lincoln, who was objectively a political genius on the level of Bismarck, is portrayed in all of his despotic, manipulative and deceptive glory. Even when it comes to Grant, who Foote admires more than anyone else (I think Foote identified with Grant’s humble origins, and resented the more aristocratic origins of most Southern leaders), he does not hold back in describing Grant’s tactical incompetence as a butcher of men who nevertheless prevails due to strategic genius. Only in the case of Sherman does Foote do injustice to the historical record of suffering on the part of the people of Georgia and the Carolinas. Sherman is an interesting case in himself, a devil of a man who brought about the demonic practice of war against women and children, a practice continued by the federal government to this day. Nevertheless, Foote can be somewhat excused due to the propaganda campaign after the war by Sherman apologists who contradicted and smeared Southern eyewitnesses to the atrocities. Only now are historians returning to the original sources for unbiased accounts of Sherman’s war crimes. Except for a few retribution raids conducted by Southern secret agents stationed in Canada, executed in revenge for Sherman’s atrocities against a few New England towns near the Canadian border, of all the major and minor invasions of Union territory by Southern forces resulted in almost no destruction of civilian property and certainly not a deliberate campaign of terror against the populace.
I finished Foote’s trilogy (each paperback books about 3 inches thick) in mid-2006. The series is so enjoyable because it is written like a novel, but relies on real history to tell its story. Stylistically, it reads like an epic, almost like poetry, and the author lulls you into a suspension of reality where you get chills down your spine that things might turn out differently. I’m reminded of a quote by William Faulkner:
“For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word and it’s all in the balance, it hasn’t happened yet, it hasn’t even begun yet, it not only hasn’t begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave yet it’s going to begin, we all know that, we have come too far with too much at stake and that moment doesn’t need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose and all this much to gain: Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world, the golden dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble, the cast made two years ago….
There’s lots of “maybe this time” in the series, as Foote withholds information about what’s going to happen and writes in a tone that leaves open the possibility of a different outcome, right up until the last possible moment.
If you’re a Southerner, or even just an American with roots in the country, you owe it to yourself to read these books- it was a shame I knew so little about the great struggle for so long.
The War Between the States retains an almost mythological status in our history; many of the events of the war, especially told from Foote’s master pen, have a surreal mythological theme to them. Even its outcome is viewed in romanticized terms. As Ron Maxwell pointed out in his essay describing what he hoped to achieve with his latest movie Gods and Generals, interpretations of the war have been subject to a false historical compromise. Namely, we are allowed to believe that the South was justified in its actions if we also consent to believe that the nation is better off for its losing. Yet, such a view is entirely inconsistent with the motives and actions of the men who actually fought the war.
Why would a man like Stonewall Jackson, who taught Bible classes to slaves and personally thought slavery to be a poor system (but not necessarily an immoral one, thus justifying the death of half a million Americans- a key distinction), say that he would rather die than see the banking and railroad interests of the North win the war? If the benefits of continued Union were so obvious, why did so many fight and die to resist those supposed benefits?
The South did not resist because she was eager for a fight, but rather because she recognized in its embryonic form the destruction of states’ rights under a new federal tyranny. As we observe the continued slouching of our country towards socialism, we see its roots in abolitionism. For both are artificial ideologies that force unnatural notions of equality onto an all too unequal world. The natural response of the ideologue, when confronted with a lack of cooperation in nature, is to impose a tyranny to correct the shortcomings of disagreeable reality.
However, the moral status of the Confederacy and its society is beyond the scope of my expertise- in this area I defer to Robert Lewis Dabney, Jackson’s chief of staff, biographer and Presbyterian theologian, whose A Defense of Virginia and the South remains the gold standard of a Biblical analysis of Southern society. I have commissioned a PDF of this work to soon be released here, so I will leave this discussion and its inevitable detractors in the hands of the capable Dr. Dabney.
What interests me more about the War Between the States is what it teaches us about ourselves, not what it teaches us about our enemies. I am one of those who believes that the South should have won- not only in a moral sense, but I believe the outcome of the war was somewhat improbable. If a little country like Vietnam can force out the world’s most powerful nation, if backwards Muslims in Algeria can push out the French and if Arabs who bow down to a meteorite can push the Soviets out of Afghanistan and the US out of Iraq, then why couldn’t a bunch of Southerners with much less of a disadvantage in numbers and with none of the cultural liabilities of the aforementioned groups push out the relatively weak federal government of the time?
The answer, I think, is paradoxical- the South was too good militarily for its own good. What should have been a guerilla war of slow bleeding of the invader, denying him the satisfaction of any real victories, turned into a conventional war. Foote describes how Lincoln, ever the grim melancholic schemer, was a leader who could handle the arithemetic of war by attrition. Lincoln calculated that, even after Lee’s greatest battlefield victory, Chancellorsville (the battle which preceded Gettysburg), if Chancellorsville were fought several more times with the same levels of casualties, then Lee’s army would be gone and a large portion of the Union army would remain.
Yet how beautiful was the victory- the thrill of Jackson’s men sneaking through a thicket to turn the flank, the panicked retreat of the enemy, the satisfaction of forcing yet another foe out of Virginia. Yet it was deadly beautiful, and throughout the war the South engaged in costly, beautiful, daring offensive actions which she could ill afford. But even as I write this, I hesitate, for the temptation of a victory, however costly, is great- almost as if part of me enjoys the thrill of the deadly beautiful loss more than an ugly arithmetic victory.
As a counterpoint, I’m sure Lee was aware of the attrition rates as well, and the goal, as always, was to capture the entire Union Army, march on Washington and end the war. But that, in perfect retrospection of course, was a high-risk strategy. If the capture of two large Confederate armies didn’t end the war by 1863, why would the capture of a Union army make any difference? And the war demonstrates the validity of the defensive, slow victory- as it was only when the butcher Grant took over in Virginia, and Lee could no longer afford an offensive, that the attrition arithemetic started to favor the South. Grant would kill 1000 of his men to kill 100 of Lee’s- and that was something that would eventually (if the strategy had been pursued earlier) enable the South to win.
The key character issue this demonstrates for us is the Southern vice of impatience- we wanted to win, settle it, and go home. No one, save the melancholic depressive Lincoln (who was the perfect personality for a melancholic depressive war the North had to fight), had the willingness to see the conflict in the long-term.
I believe much of this has its roots in our deep culture, if not biology. One of the distinctive themes of Nordic mythology is pessimism- in short, warriors go to the great hall of Valhalla, where they gather in preparation of the final battle between good and evil, Ragnarök. It has already been prophesied, and is known and believed, that evil will win the battle. Yet, stoically, the warriors prepare for battle anyway, for glory and duty have meaning beyond mere victory.
Similarly, Southerners have a sense of fatalism about them, but ironically instead of manifesting itself in apathy it becomes fierce aggression- since the outcome, whatever it is, is already pre-ordained, the only controllable variables are stoic resolve, daring and glory.
Perhaps no other officer in the Confederacy embodied this ideal than Texan John Bell Hood- after reading about his record as a commander, though glorious, I can understand why the feds named the largest military base in the free world after him.
I recently read a book about Jefferson Davis by Hamilton Eckenrode, the state historian of Virginia in the 1920’s. The book has many flaws, but its uniqueness is its anthropological analysis of the characters of the war. He describes Hood this way, at the time when he was appointed as Western commander, a time when the South demanded someone who would yet again launch an offensive:
John B. Hood was an office of rising reputation…Fame had come to him as the head of a Texas brigade, the best in the service…A born fighter, a perfect animal organism without knowledge of fear, he was little affected by wounds that would have killed men of less superabundant vitality [at this point Hood had lost use of his left arm and had his right leg amputated]. In appearance, as in character, he was the typical Nordic fighting man, with his stalwart presence, his blue eyes and his long golden beard. He might have been Coeur de Lion reincarnated. It shows how unerringly race tells that in the last crisis of the Confederacy, when a fighter was demanded, the choice fell on a pure-blooded Nordic, this descendant of the Viking past.
Hood left Georgia with an army, and came back from Tennessee without one. But, oh, what a glorious trip- you’ll have to read Foote for the details.
What are the practical implications of this character flaw of Southerners, this impatience, this need to settle things quickly and throw dice in the face of the odds? How can we correct for this problem in future political struggles? For such contains the secrets to the liberation of our country- not just the South, but the rest of the Heartland under occupation from the respective coastal elites. I’ll cover that in part two.
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